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COMMENTARY
Ronald J. Tabakt
I. Purpose in Organizing the Panel Discussion
When the American Bar Association's Section on Individual
Rights and Responsibilities decided to organize a panel discussion
on Politics and the Death Penalty (a program which several other
ABA entities agreed to co-sponsor), our purpose was to illuminate
the variety of effects of a widespread perception: the belief of legis-
lators, governors, prosecutors, judges, clemency boards, political
candidates and others that the public is overwhelmingly in support
of capital punishment.8 0 In the wake of Governor Dukakis' inept
response to the opening question in 1988's crucial third presidential
debate, 1 the political community has evidently concluded that it is
t Special Counsel, Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom, Coordinator of Pro
Bono Program, Chair of the Committee on the Death Penalty for the American Bar
Association's Section of Individual Rights and Responsibilities. The opinions ex-
pressed in this commentary solely represent the views of the author.
80. Although public opinion surveys support the contention that Americans are in
favor of the death penalty, these statistics may be misleading elected officials and
others into believing that the public overwhelmingly prefers the death penalty over
any alternative. Many polls suggest that when presented with the option of life im-
prisonment with no chance of parole, many people prefer life imprisonment over the
death penalty. See William J. Bowers, The Death Penalty's Shaky Support, N.Y.
TIMES, May 28, 1990, at A21 ("The recent political stampede on execution could be
the product of pollsters failing to ask the right questions or misreading the results. In
truth, the public's desire for capital punishment is far weaker than opinion polls sug-
gest."); WILLIAM J. BOWERS & MARGARET VANDIVER, NEW YORKERS WANT AN
ALTERNATIVE TO THE DEATH PENALTY, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF A NEW YORK
STATE SURVEY CONDUCTED MAR. 1-4, at 3 (1991) (54.6% of New Yorkers prefer life
without parole to the death penalty, and 72% prefer life without parole if the prisoner
is forced to pay restitution to the victim's family); Susan Gilmore, Strong Support in
State for Death Penalty-But 1 in 3 Prefer Prison For Murderers, SEATTLE TIMES,
Dec. 30, 1992 (national Gallup poll discovered that although 76% of those polled said
they favored the death penalty, only 53% chose death over life in prison without
parole); World Politics and Current Affairs; American Survey, ECONOMIST, Mar. 24,
1990, at 25 (finding that 80% of Americans are in favor of the death penalty, although
the proportion drops when the alternative of life imprisonment is offered); RICHARD
C. DIETER, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, SENTENCING FOR LIFE: AMERI-
CANS EMBRACE ALTERNATIVES TO THE DEATH PENALTY (Apr. 1993) (demonstrating
that more Americans would choose life without parole plus restitution to their vic-
tim's families over the death penalty for first degree murder). But see George Skel-
ton, The Times Poll; Voters Favor Execution By Nearly 4 to 1, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 2,
1990, at 1 (60% of Californians favored the death penalty over life imprisonment
without parole, 32% favored life imprisonment, and 8% did not know).
81. Governor Dukakis was presented with a hypothetical situation in which his
wife was raped and murdered, and then was asked how he would feel about imposing
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politically fatal to come out against the death penalty and its
speedy implementation.82
In several large states' 1990 gubernatorial elections, candidates
vied to outdo each other in asserting how many executions they
would secure.83 Meanwhile, in a growing number of state judicial
elections, incumbent state supreme court justices have been at-
tacked for sometimes ruling in favor of the constitutional claims of
particular death row inmates; and in some such campaigns, such as
the 1992 campaign in which Mississippi Supreme Court Justice
James Robertson was defeated,84 these attacks have succeeded.
Yet, at the same time, the United States Supreme Court has contin-
ued to drastically cut back on the federal courts' ability to adjudi-
cate fairly the habeas corpus petitions of death row inmates who
seek to challenge the constitutionality of their convictions and
sentences.85 In deciding on these issues, the Supreme Court has
asserted that the very state court judiciaries which have been at-
tacked for their occasional granting of relief to death row inmates
can be counted on to enforce the Constitution in these highly con-
troversial cases.
the death penalty on such a person. Glenn L. Pierce & Michael L. Radelet, The Role
and Consequences of the Death Penalty in American Politics, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
Soc. CHANGE 711, 711 (1991). His response was devoid of emotion and simply re-
stated his doctrinal position on the death penalty.
82. See id.
83. See, e.g., Brian E. Crowley, THE GAINESVILLE SUN, Mar. 11, 1990 (Florida
Governor Bob Martinez ran commercials in his re-election campaign bragging, "I
now have signed some 90 death warrants in the state of Florida."); BRIAN LANE,
MURDER UPDATE 244 (1991) ("In Texas, Attorney General Jim Mattox, a Demo-
cratic candidate for governor, advertised himself on television as the man who has
'carried out 32 death penalties' not personally, you understand, but through a
proxy.").
84. James Robertson, a Mississippi Supreme Court Justice who sometimes voted
to overturn death sentences, was voted out following aggressive campaigning against
him, which included attacks on him by local prosecutors and victims rights groups.
Phil Noble & Associates, Feinstein and the 1990 Gubernatorial Campaign 176-77
(July 1992) (unpublished manuscript on file with the Fordham Urban Law Journal).
For example, one advertisement urged the populace to "vote against Robertson be-
cause he's opposed to the death penalty and he wants to let all these people go." Id.
85. Four areas in which the Supreme Court has cut back on death row inmates'
access to federal habeas corpus are: procedural default, retroactivity, evidentiary
hearings, and abuse of the writ. See, e.g., Wainright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) (pro-
cedural default); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (retroactivity); Keeney v.
Tamayo-Reyes, 112 S.Ct 1715 (1992) (evidentiary hearings); Sawyer v. Whitley, 112
S.Ct. 2514 (1992) (abuse of writ); see also Ronald J. Tabak & J. Mark Lane, Judicial
Activism and Legislative "Reform" of Federal Habeas Corpus: A Critical Analysis of
Recent Developments and Current Proposals, 55 ALB. L. REV. 1, 35-55 (1991).
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Legislation based on that same premise, under which it would be
virtually impossible for death row inmates' constitutional claims to
be considered by the federal courts, was supported by the Bush
Administration, was passed by the Senate, and came within a few
votes of being passed by the House of Representatives in 1991.86
And while Congress has engaged in spirited debates about the fu-
ture of habeas corpus, the death penalty itself no longer generates
a serious debate in Congress. There Was no such debate in the
1992 presidential election either. Governor Clinton, as part of his
effort to portray himself as a "new Democrat", advocated the
death penalty and even interrupted his primary campaign to return
to Arkansas so that he could deny clemency to a brain-damaged
death row inmate, Ricky Rector.8 7
In view of these events, we thought it would be useful to bring
together knowledgeable people from a variety of perspectives to
discuss (a) how the capital punishment system and the political
process have been affected by the perceived overwhelming popular
support for the death penalty, (b) the role that reportage - or the
lack thereof - has had on public attitudes about the death penalty
and (c) whether opponents of capital punishment can survive
politically.
II. Highlights of the Program
A. Racial Discrimination in Capital Punishment
Professor James Coleman of Duke University School of Law dis-
cussed the Supreme Court's handling of the death penalty, starting
with its 1972 holding in Furman v. Georgia88 declaring all then-
existing death sentences unconstitutional. While there was no ma-
jority opinion for the Court in Furman, a major factor underlying
the Court's holding was the belief that juries had had unbridled
discretion in deciding whether or not to impose the death penalty,
86. See Tabak & Lane, supra note 85, at 56-62, 93 (discussing the legislation which
was defeated by 10 votes).
87. See Lawyer: Execution a Disgrace, N.Y. NEWSDAY, May 4, 1992, at 3 ("After
Ricky Rector was executed by lethal injection, guards on death row found the slice of
pecan pie from his final meal untouched on a saucer in his cell. In a decade behind
bars, Rector always saved his dessert until bedtime. His lawyers say Rector left the
slice of pecan pie because he believed he would return to his cell and did not under-
stand his life was about to end"). Rector also believed that he would have a chance to
vote for Clinton's presidential candidacy. Id. ("An hour before the execution, Rector
was watching a network newscast about Clinton's alleged affair with Gennifer Flow-
ers, . . . Rector [said] that he was going to vote for Clinton."). Id.
88. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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and that this discretion had, among other things, led to race being a
major factor in the imposition of capital punishment.8 9 Professor
Coleman concluded that there is still unguided discretion under the
capital punishment regimes which the Supreme Court has ap-
proved as constitutional in the years since Furman. Indeed, in the
1987 McCleskey case,' the Court held that substantial racial dis-
crimination in the imposition of the death penalty based on the
victim's race would be constitutionally acceptable. 91
Bryan Stevenson discussed how an Alabama state court judge,
immediately after bemoaning in private the demagogic pro-death
penalty arguments of a gubernatorial candidate, took the bench
and rejected "with gusto" clear evidence of racial discrimination in
the selection of an all-white jury for the capital trial of an African-
American man. This evidence included the facts that the prosecu-
tor had four lists of prospective jurors: one marked "strong", one
marked "medium", one marked "weak" and one, covering all black
jurors, marked "black", and that the prosecutor had peremptorily
challenged twenty-four of the twenty-six black prospective jurors
in securing an all-white jury.
B. Ineffective Counsel in Capital Trials
Several of the panelists stated that the lawyers whom state court
judges have appointed to represent defendants in capital trials have
frequently lacked the requisite experience, knowledge, resources,
and commitment to represent these clients effectively. Shabaka
Sundiata Waglini, who came within hours of being executed by the
State of Florida, discussed his experience of being convicted and
sentenced to death for a crime he did not commit, an experience he
believes might not have occurred if his lawyer had not been only
three years out of law school. Bryan Stevenson said that many
states, particularly several Southern states with large death rows,
provide no funding whatsoever for criminal defense work. This
leaves local governments in states such as Texas with the responsi-
bility of paying for defense counsel for the poor. Many local gov-
ernments consider this a politically unpalatable burden and do not
undertake it properly.92
89. Id.
90. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
91. Id.
92. See, e.g., Spangenberg Group, A Study of Representation of Capital Cases in
Texas (Mar. 1993).
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Pennsylvania Attorney General Ernest Preate stated, based on
his extensive experience as a prosecutor, that in too many cases
there is ineffective assistance of counsel on both sides. He said
there is therefore a need for (a) counsel standards and (b) state
and federal funding for counsel and for litigation support centers,
since the effective assistance of counsel is "the foundation of our
entire system. ' '93 He stressed that "these kinds of cases ought to be
tried by our best lawyers, then appealed by the best lawyers, on
both sides, and be argued before juries and before courts by people
of experience and knowledge and competency."
C. Judicial Overrides of Juries' Life Verdicts
Shabaka and Bryan Stevenson discussed a relatively new way in
which discretion is being exercised arbitrarily in a few states, in-
cluding Florida, Indiana, and Alabama. In these states, statutes en-
acted after Furman permit elected state judges, with their eyes on
the next election, to override juries which have decided that de-
fendants should not receive the death penalty.94 Mr. Stevenson
noted that in Alabama, about twenty five percent of death row in-
mates are people for whom their juries recommended life
sentences, and that such judicial overrides occur with far greater
frequency during judicial election years.
D. Procedural Obstacles to Reaching the Merits of Meritorious
Constitutional Claims
At many capital trials, the Constitution is violated in a manner
which can affect the outcome. However, in a growing percentage
of cases, death row inmates are no longer able to secure federal
court rulings on whether their federal constitutional rights have
been violated. Professor Coleman explained the reason why: the
Supreme Court has in recent years created a series of procedural
obstacles which prevent federal courts from adjudicating the merits
of federal constitutional claims. Thus, whether one lives or dies
often depends on such things as (a) whether one's trial lawyer
knew enough to object to actions by the prosecution or the judge
which violated the Constitution, (b) whether by early on in the
death row inmate's appeal process, rather than a little later, the
93. I believe that federal funding should be limited to the defense side, since the
states should pay for their own prosecutions.
94. See Schiro v. Farley, 114 S. Ct. 783 (1994) (upholding Indiana death sentence
where jury returned a verdict of life imprisonment and judge overrode jury's decision
and imposed death penalty).
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Supreme Court has found a constitutional violation in a context so
similar to the death row inmate's case that all reasonable jurists
would thereafter necessarily rule in the death row inmate's favor
and (c) whether the volunteer counsel who represented the death
row inmate during his first federal court proceeding had the knowl-
edge and the resources to develop evidence of constitutional viola-
tions (or whether such violations were not uncovered until after the
first federal court proceedings).
There have even been situations in which one co-defendant has
lived and another co-defendant in the same case has died solely
because of such factors.95 Moreover, the Supreme Court has in its
last two completed terms (a) curtailed the ability of prisoners to
have the federal courts conduct evidentiary hearings with respect
to constitutional claims where crucial facts were not developed in
the state courts,96 (b) changed the traditional standard for harmless
error, so that from now on in habeas cases, there will be situations
in which relief will be denied even though the constitutional viola-
tion is not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt,97 and (c) held that
the federal courts will not consider evidence that a death row in-
mate is actually innocent, even when there is no way to bring that
evidence to bear in the state courts, unless the evidence of inno-
cence is so overwhelming that every reasonable person would be-
lieve the defendant to be innocent.98
E. Legislative Efforts That Would Further Curtail Habeas
Corpus
One might hope that, as the American Bar Association has ad-
vocated, legislative efforts to "reform" habeas corpus would elimi-
nate some or all of these procedural obstacles to granting relief on
meritorious constitutional claims. However, the legislation on
habeas corpus introduced in early August 1993 by Senate Judiciary
Committee Chairman Joseph Biden (and later endorsed by Presi-
dent Clinton and Attorney General Reno) would not accomplish
that task. The Biden bill resulted from negotiations with prosecu-
tors, according to Attorney General Preate. Bryan Stevenson said
that the defense bar was excluded from these negotiations, and he
95. See, e.g., Tabak & Lane, supra note 21, at 39-40 (discussing the executed John
Eldon Smith and his co-defendant Rebecca Machetti).
96. Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 112 S.Ct 1715 (1992).
97. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S.Ct 1710 (1993).
98. Herrera v. Collins, 113 S.Ct 853 (1993).
19941
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expressed skepticism about what he had heard about the Biden bill
(which he had not yet had the opportunity to review).
Stevenson's skepticism seems justified, since the Biden bill
would further curtail habeas corpus. For example, the Biden bill
would impose a very short statute of limitations on habeas peti-
tions, and would preclude second and subsequent habeas petitions
in virtually all circumstances, even where unconstitutional State
misconduct or the complete unavailability of crucial facts made the
presentation of particular claims impossible previously. More-
over, the Biden bill would not (a) clearly reject any of the recently
imposed procedural obstacles to rulings on the merits of the case or
(b) require that trial and postconviction counsel be appointed by
authorities which are independent of the state judiciary (whose ap-
pointments of trial counsel have often led to inadequate represen-
tation.)99 The crime bill approved by the House-Senate conference
committee in the previous Congress (but which was not enacted)
was superior to the 1993 Biden bill in these respects. 1°°
F. Political Threats to Judges' Principled Consideration of
Capital Cases
The Supreme Court has justified some of its decisions which de-
prive death row inmates of meaningful access to the federal courts
by asserting that capital cases can be, and are, fairly decided by the
state courts. While that is often true, Chief Justice James Exum of
North Carolina discussed a growing threat to the state courts' abil-
ity to do their job properly in such cases. He explained that state
judges face increasing obstacles in seeking to retain their judge-
ships if they have sometimes overturned death sentences due to
constitutional errors. Chief Justice Exum said that judicial election
campaigns have become increasingly strident and have frequently
focused on assertions about how judges have voted and would vote
in capital punishment cases. He also stated that it has become
more perilous for state judges to decide capital cases properly, in
view of oversimplistic and sometimes inaccurate press accounts of
their decisions - such as press attacks on the North Carolina
Supreme Court for not finding harmless error in a circumstance in
which binding precedent precluded a harmless error inquiry.
99. See supra note 39.
100. The very different crime bills passed in 1993 by the Senate and the House have
no provisions on habeas corpus. Various habeas corpus provisions will likely be con-
sidered by Congress in 1994.
286
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Subsequent to the program, there has been a new development
which threatens the independence of both the state judiciary and
the federal judiciary. On October 15, 1993, the New York Times
reported that "Senate Republicans have given notice that they will
challenge any of President Clinton's judicial nominees they con-
sider insufficiently committed to the death penalty."''1 1 "[Key] Re-
publican staff members said the death penalty is a politically potent
issue and worth raising . . . ."02
Two state supreme court justices whom President Clinton nomi-
nated to federal appeals courts have already come under attack
from conservatives for their supposed insufficient support for capi-
tal punishment. One of them, Justice Martha Craig Daughtrey of
the Tennessee Supreme Court, has nevertheless been confirmed by
the Senate. The other nominee, Chief Justice Rosemary Barkett of
Florida, has not yet been voted on by the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee as of February 1994,03 despite widespread support for her
nomination from members of the Florida bar, Florida elected offi-
cials, and newspapers.1' 4 Chief Justice Barkett was retained in her
state judicial position with sixty-one percent of the vote in 1992,
after a campaign in which she fended off attacks that she was soft
on crime by stressing "that she has voted to uphold death sentences
more than two hundred times.' 10 5
Even if judges like Chief Justice Exum and Chief Justice Barkett
win re-election, and even if judges like Justice Daughtrey win con-
firmation to the federal courts, these kinds of campaigns and litmus
tests for confirmation have pernicious effects. How can anyone
have confidence that such judges are not affected, in ruling on capi-
tal punishment cases, by their perceived political needs, either in
seeking retention in office or in securing confirmation to a federal
office? There is every reason to believe that, at least in some close
cases, certain state judges and some federal judges who hope to be
appointed someday to higher courts will decide against death row
inmates in order to increase their death penalty affirmance statis-
101. Neil A. Lewis, G.O.P. To Challenge Judicial Nominees Who Oppose Death
Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1993, at A26.
102. Id.
103. Joan Biskupic, Nominee Defends Death Penalty Stance, WASH. POST, Feb. 4,
1994, at A20 (committee vote on Barkett's nomination not yet been scheduled).
104. See, e.g., U.S. Court Nominee Barkett Says She Isn't Soft on Crime, MIAMI
HERALD, Nov. 17, 1993, at 5B.
105. Paul Anderson, Barkett Set To Go Before Senate Panel, MIAMI HERALD, Jan.
31, 1994, at 5B.
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tics. Thus, the Senate Republicans' recent pronouncements will
likely exacerbate an already outrageous situation.
G. Systemic Reasons Why Many Innocent People Are
Sentenced to Death
Under the highly politicized system in which (a) many prosecu-
tors build their careers by securing death sentences, (b) many state
judges perceive their futures as dependent on their imposing and
upholding death sentences, (c) defense counsel are ineffectual, and
(d) the federal courts are increasingly precluded from rectifying se-
rious constitutional violations, it is not surprising that, as Shabaka
and Bryan Stevenson stated, many innocent people are being sen-
tenced to death. Indeed, Mr. Stevenson's innocent client, Walter
MacMillian, was put on death row before his case even went to trial.
Journalist Nat Hentoff noted that the fact that numerous innocent
people are receiving the death sentence, and the reasons underly-
ing that fact, are woefully underreported. 1°6
New York University Law School Dean Emeritus Norman Red-
lich pointed out that clemency proceedings, which in the past were
often the last safeguard against arbitrary and capricious executions,
have in recent years also been affected by politics. One such exam-
ple has already been mentioned-presidential candidate Bill
Clinton's return to Arkansas in time to deny clemency for Ricky
Rector. Dean Redlich also referred to the extraordinary number
of executions taking place in Texas. Clemency has been regularly
and often perfunctorily denied in Texas, even when both the vic-
tim's family and the trial prosecutor have supported clemency. 10 7
Shabaka pointed out that even after the Florida Assistant Attor-
ney General handling Shabaka's case expressed doubts to the Gov-
ernor about Shabaka's guilt, the Governor still denied clemency.10 8
Professor Coleman stated that one Governor of Florida had accel-
erated the issuance of execution warrants during his election year,
106. This fact can be laboriously pieced together from numerous ad hoc reports on
particular cases. See Tabak & Lane, supra note 21.
107. See, e.g., Tabak, supra note 9 at 845 (execution of Kenneth Albert Brock);
Robert Davis, Unlikely Execution-Eve Plea, USA TODAY, Dec. 10, 1992, at 4A (dis-
cussing the impending execution of convicted killer Timothy Dale Bunch despite
pleas by the victim's family to let him live).
108. Shabaka was eventually released, but only through federal habeas corpus
proceedings.
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and another Florida Governor tried to claim credit for a well-publi-
cized execution as part of his re-election campaign. 10 9
In view of many Governors' strenuous efforts to gain political
support through executions, it is not surprising that they (or the
pardons boards they appoint) frequently deny clemency even when
there is strong evidence of a miscarriage of justice. Indeed, the
granting of clemency continues to be virtually non-existent in most
states, and is far less available than in earlier decades in which
there were executions." 0
Ironically, as part of the "passing the buck" syndrome which per-
meates our capital punishment system today, some governors have
contended that the existence of "super due process" in the adjudi-
cation of capital cases means that clemency need not receive seri-
ous consideration."' So, at the very time that (a) state judicial
independence has been badly tarnished by judicial campaigns and
federal judicial nomination proceedings in which the death penalty
is a major issue, (b) the federal courts' ability to grant relief when
meritorious constitutional claims are presented has been drastically
curtailed, and (c) the Supreme Court has announced that execu-
tions can be carried out without any judicial consideration of sub-
stantial evidence of innocence, clemency is being denied on the
pretext that the courts are ensuring that justice is being done in
capital cases.
109. See Brian Crowley, Bob Martinez is Singing the Executioner's Song, GAINS-
VILLE SUN, Mar. 11, 1990.
110. A death row inmate "has the right to seek clemency from the executive branch
of the state government: either the governor or the pardons board." Tabak, supra
note 9, at 844. Critics, however, note that the chance of receiving clemency in a death
penalty case has become extremely poor. Id. For example, between 1981 and 1986,
no southern state, with the exception of Florida and Texas, granted clemency to a
death row inmate. Id.
Thus, state governors have abdicated their authority to decide whether or not in-
mates should actually be executed. Id. Several governors have justified their refusals
to grant clemency by asserting that sentencing should be determined by juries and the
courts. Id. Such refusals to execute this responsibility for clemency decisions are evi-
dently due to the political climate and will continue until it once again becomes "ac-
ceptable" to grant clemency. Id. (citing J. Mattox, comments on ABC News
Nightline, Show #1439, Transcript at 5-6 (Nov. 27, 1986)).
For a more recent discussion of the arbitrary nature of clemency, and how difficult
and rare it is today for governors to pardon death row prisoners, see Tamar Lewin,
Vast Discretion for Governors In Decisions on Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, May 20,
1992, at A14; Jason Berry, Governors Shy Away From Death Row Pardons, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Aug. 15, 1993.
111. See Tabak, supra note 9, at 845.
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H. Irrational Political Discourse And Inadequate Reportage
About the Death Penalty
The perpetuation and expansion of the death penalty, the in-
crease in executions, and the curtailment of the enforcement of the
Constitution seems to have occurred without a substantial public
outcry. This is due largely to irrational political discourse, failures
of reportage,, and the failure of many public officials and candi-
dates to realize that opposition to the death penalty and support of
habeas corpus need not be politically fatal. Several of the panelists
spoke about these points.
Bryan Stevenson pointed out that the continued assertions by
politicians that the death penalty will do something about crime
has had "an irrational effect on the way we think about crime."
New York Assemblywoman Susan John noted that in reality, the
murder rate remains extremely high in Texas, a state which is exe-
cuting people with a frequency unprecedented in recent decades." 2
This holds true for other states which have executed large numbers
of people.
Bryan Stevenson further commented that our society is being ir-
rational in continuing to rely on the death penalty as a solution for
crime, instead of dealing with people in trouble (i.e. victims of
physical or sexual abuse, drug addicts, the homeless, the mentally
ill) before such people commit capital crimes. Moreover, he said,
society's reliance on such a discriminatorily imposed sanction has
crushed the hopes and aspirations of many people, particularly
those living on the margins of society. It has also promoted disre-
spect for the law.
Society might act more rationally if all the facts about capital
punishment were more widely reported, as Nat Hentoff advocated.
Such underreported facts include the numerous due process viola-
tions associated with the death penalty, the frequency with which
innocent people are sentenced to death, and the courts' typical fail-
ure to grant any relief when defense counsel has been incompe-
tent.1 3 Mr. Hentoff also criticized the press' failure to correct
disinformation disseminated in political campaigns, such as the
112. See David Margolick, As Texas Death Row Grows, Fewer Lawyers Help In-
mates, N.Y. TiMEs, Dec. 31, 1993, at Al.
113. In one such example, defense counsel failed to give the jury readily available
mitigating information about the defendant's honorable military record, his coopera-
tion with the police, and his lack of any prior criminal record. It is quite likely that
awareness of these factors might have led the jury to spare the defendant's life. Mes-
ser v. Kemp, 760 F.2d 1080, 1096 (11th Cir. 1985) (Johnson, J., dissenting), cert denied,
474 U.S. 1088 (1986).
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false assertion that if a defendant convicted of a capital crime is not
executed, he will be released from prison in a few years and com-
mit more murders. In reality, most states now have some version
of life without parole under which a defendant convicted of capital
murder - the only type of murder for which the defendant could
receive the death penalty - cannot be considered for parole ever,
or depending on the state, for at least twenty five years.114
The public needs to understand that although convicted murder-
ers are sometimes released on parole, that is totally irrelevant to
the debate over capital punishment. It is irrelevant because per-
sons convicted of capital murder, if not sentenced to death, are sen-
tenced in virtually all states to some form of life imprisonment
without parole. Thus, the frequently made argument that only cap-
ital punishment could prevent convicted murderers from being re-
leased in a few years and committing further murders is fallacious
on two counts: capital punishment cannot prevent their release if
their convictions are not for capital murder; and the alternative to
capital punishment does prevent their release if their convictions
are for capital murder.
Public misconception on this subject has been a serious problem
in death penalty trials because jurors are typically not allowed to
have their questions about the parole consequences of a life sen-
tence answered."' Generally, jurors who ask for but are denied
such information proceed to return verdicts of death. In October
1993, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in a South Carolina
case which raises the issue of whether the Constitution requires
that jurors be provided with accurate information about life with-
out parole." 6 If the Court decides that the Constitution does re-
quire that jurors understand the consequences of life without
parole, this could lead to better informed juries. Unfortunately,
however, this will not have the same effect on a still uninformed
electorate.
114. See Dieter, supra note 80, at 1 ("Forty-five states and the federal government
now employ sentences in which no parole is possible for at least 25 years for their
more serious murder cases. In two-thirds of the states, those who are not given the
death penalty face life imprisonment with no possibility of parole ever. Yet only 4%
of Americans believe that those convicted of first degree murder would spend the rest
of their lives in prison . . ").
115. See id. ("Jurors serving in capital cases.., frequently assume that their choice
is between a meaningless life sentence and death. Judges are often forbidden by law
from explaining to the jury that inmates must now serve 25, 35 or more years before
even becoming eligible for parole.").
116. State v. Simmons, 427 S.E.2d 175 (Sup. Ct. S.C.), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 57
(Oct. 4, 1993). The Supreme Court heard oral argument on this case in January 1994.
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Assemblywoman John raised another death penalty "misnomer"
when she discussed the widespread misconception that it is cheaper
to kill a criminal than to keep him alive in prison for the rest of his
life. In fact, the death penalty system in the United States is more
expensive than the alternative of life imprisonment without pa-
role.117 Capital murder trials are more expensive for many reasons,
such as: greater costs for expert testimony, more intense juror voir
dire, and two phase trials." 8 For example, in Florida each death
sentence costs approximately 3.18 million dollars, while life impris-
onment (based on forty years in prison) is estimated to cost
$516,000. 19
I. Misconceptions About the Inevitability of Political Death for
Death Penalty Opponents
While recognizing the public's misconceptions about the death
penalty, Dean Redlich and Assemblywoman John contended that
public officials and political candidates may still be misperceiving
the intensity of people's views on capital punishment. To support
this assertion, Dean Redlich cited the experience of a political ac-
tion committee in New York which supports anti-death penalty
candidates for the state legislature. Dean Redlich noted that this
PAC has had substantial success, including the defeats of several
incumbents who had switched from opposing to supporting the
death penalty during their re-election campaigns.
One of those incumbents was defeated by Assemblywoman
John, even though the election occurred just four days before the
highly publicized trial of a serial murderer. Because the incum-
bents who switched their positions on the death penalty were de-
feated, an Albany newspaper ran the headline "Support for death
penalty fatal for assemblymen."' 2 ° Assemblywoman John believes
that the electorate perceives the candidates' views on the death
penalty as a matter of character and principle, and will react
117. See Philip J. Cook & Donna B. Slawson, Terry Sanford Institute of Public Pol-
icy, Duke Univ., The Costs of Processing Murder Cases in North Carolina 1 (1993)
("All told, the extra cost per death penalty imposed is over a quarter million dollars,
and per execution exceeds $2 million"). See generally Robert L. Spangenberg & Eliza-
beth R. Walsh, Capital Punishment or Life Imprisonment? Some Cost Considerations,
23 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 45 (1989) for a more in depth analysis of the costs associated
with the death penalty; Tabak & Lane, supra note 35, at 133-38.
118. See Pierce & Radelet, supra note 81, at 719.
119. Id.
120. Robert Borsellino, Support for death penalty fatal for assemblymen, TIMES
UNION, Sept. 12, 1990, at 1.
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harshly to candidates who appear to support the death penalty for
purely political reasons.121
As Dean Redlich suggested, it is quite possible that New York's
experience may not be typical of the entire country. Indeed, Chief
Justice Exum of North Carolina stated that strident political cam-
paign attacks on judges who sometimes rule in favor of death row
inmates are increasing, and are threatening the integrity of judicial
campaigns. However, in light of numerous public opinion polls in-
dicating that more people may prefer some form of life without
parole over the death penalty, 22 it appears likely that many polit-
ical candidates and public officials who privately oppose capital
punishment and support the strengthening of habeas corpus would
survive politically if they took those same positions publicly.
Most politicians and political advisors never look past the first
(and usually the only) death penalty question in public opinion
polls: Do you favor the death penalty? Yet such a simplistic ques-
tion, asked in isolation, without any alternative mentioned, is de-
ceptive. When a tough alternative to death is provided, support for
capital punishment drops dramatically, generally below fifty per-
cent.123 Because pollsters usually do not ask about that alternative
and because most people do not know that that alternative actually
exists, the public's responses to the usual simplistic poll questions
may be misleading political candidates. Accordingly, it is crucial
that the press, or anti-death penalty candidates, correct the misin-
formation on this subject.
IMl. A Perspective
The enactment, expansion, upholding and implementation of
capital punishment in the United States since the mid-1970's has
been characterized by the failure to exercise moral leadership or
even to engage in rational discourse. A greatly increased percent-
age of the executive branch officials, legislators, judges and polit-
ical candidates who believe that the death penalty accomplishes
nothing and is carried out in an arbitrary, discriminatory, and even
"freakish" manner are still unwilling to vote or advocate against
capital punishment because they fear committing political suicide.
121. Indeed, in 1990, the gubernatorial candidates in Texas, Florida and California
who supported the death penalty most stridently, ie., Mark White, Jim Mattox and
Clayton Williams in Texas, Governor Martinez in Florida, and Diane Feinstein in Cal-
ifornia, were all defeated.
122. See supra note 80.
123. Id.
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Some of these people are also afraid to support the availability of
habeas corpus relief for death row inmates who have been con-
victed or sentenced unconstitutionally because they fear that doing
so would leave them fatally vulnerable to attacks that they are soft
on crime. Elected state judges are often influenced by these same
factors.
As for the United States Supreme Court, how does one explain
the votes upholding the constitutionality of the death penalty cast
by such justices as Lewis Powell who, following his retirement, said
that the death penalty is not, and probably could not ever be, effec-
tive as a deterrent,124 and that he has moral objections to it? I
believe that Justice Powell and some of his colleagues who (unlike
Justice Powell) voted in 1972 in Furman v. Georgia to vacate all
existing death sentences, had concluded by 1976 that the Court had
gotten too far out in front of public opinion in Furman. Some of
these justices were apparently surprised and taken aback when
dozens of state legislatures enacted new capital punishment stat-
utes in the years immediately following Furman.
These developments, when combined with public opinion polls
purporting to show overwhelming support for the death penalty,
made it appear that the public's respect for the Court might be
jeopardized if it held all of the newly enacted death penalty laws
unconstitutional. This may be why, in contrast to its handling of
abortion (on which public opinion was reportedly more evenly di-
vided), the Court took only four years, from 1972 until 1976, to
substantially retreat from its holding in Furman. Thereafter, as nu-
merous political candidates and elected officials began to blame
the federal courts for the amount of time between homicides and
executions, the Supreme Court began to curtail the ability of death
row inmates to get rulings on the merits of their meritorious consti-
tutional claims. In the numerous instances since 1976 when it has
done so, the Court has failed to point out that much of the delay in
capital cases typically occurs in the state courts, and that by impos-
ing new procedural obstacles the Court was inevitably causing the
executions of (a) innocent people and (b) people whose fundamen-
tal rights under the Bill of Rights had been violated in egregious,
highly prejudicial ways.125 The arbitrary and capricious effects of
such decisions have become so apparent to Justice Harry
Blackmun over the years that he has recently concluded that this
124. Tabak & Lane, supra note 35.
125. Tabak & Lane, supra note 21.
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country's capital punishment system - whose constitutionality he
had voted to uphold in Furman - violates the Constitution. 126
Unfortunately, it is unlikely that the Supreme Court will find the
capital punishment system unconstitutional any time in the near
future, or retreat from its assaults on habeas corpus. This means
that for the foreseeable future, attacks on capital punishment must
be made principally in the political arena. But in order for there to
be a real political debate about the death penalty, it is necessary
that more political candidates and elected officials who oppose the
death penalty, or who wish to put some teeth back into habeas
corpus, say so publicly and effectively.
The reason this has not happened in recent years is largely due
to the political community's misunderstanding of why Governor
Dukakis' debate answer on the capital punishment question was so
devastating. Governor Dukakis' answer was disastrous because he
did not seem to care about heinous crimes on any emotional level;
he did not even seem troubled by the thought of his wife being
horrendously raped and murdered. Instead, he presented, in
robotic fashion, certain policy arguments about the death penalty.
If he had instead expressed real rage about crime and had passion-
ately attacked his opponent for defrauding the public with phony
arguments about the supposed virtues of the death penalty, crucial
swing voters would likely have respected him, even if they sup-
ported the death penalty. Many of them would have voted for him,
much as so many pro-death penalty New York voters have repeat-
edly voted for Governor Cuomo. Thus, it was not Governor
Dukakis' position on the death penalty that was so harmful to his
candidacy; it was the manner in which he expressed that position.
However, the conventional political wisdom is that it was Gover-
nor Dukakis' position on the death penalty that did him in. As a
result, the typical moderate or progressive candidate in the years
since 1988, even if he previously opposed the death penalty, has
stated that he now favors the death penalty, or that if he still per-
sonally opposes it, he will nevertheless be a leader in its enforce-
ment.127  Even Andrew Young abandoned his lifelong total
126. See Collins v. Collins, 1993 WL 530954 (Feb. 22, 1994) (Blackmun, J.
dissenting)
127. For example, Kathleen Brown, who intends to run for Governor of California
in 1994, takes the position that she opposes the death penalty but would nevertheless
enforce it. See William Hamilton, California, Here I Gun, WASH. POST., Jan.17-23,
1994, at 16. She is nonetheless being attacked by political opponents, who contend
that she would, like her father, former Governor Edmund G. Brown, commute many
death sentences and that she lacks the "courage of her convictions." Id.
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opposition to the death penalty when running for Governor of
Georgia in 1990, stating that he now favored it in certain
circumstances.128
As for President Clinton, he has exercised a steely determination
to never again be labeled as "soft on crime "129 following his defeat
for re-election as Governor of Arkansas in 1980, when his pardons
of several criminals were said to be a major factor in his loss. 130 In
his first two-year term, Clinton "was widely viewed as opposed to
capital punishment for declining to set execution dates for two
dozen death-row inmates",' 3' and he commuted life without parole
sentences of forty-four convicted murderers and twenty-two other
criminals. 132 But in his near-decade in the governor's chair follow-
ing his 1980 defeat and his 1982 victory, Clinton "moved swiftly to
set execution dates,' 33 granted clemency to murderers with life
without parole sentences only seven times, never granted elemency
to stop an execution, and permitted several executions to be car-
ried out. 3 4  Indeed, in January 1992, Clinton interrupted his
campaigning in the crucial New Hampshire primary in order to re-
turn to Arkansas and deny clemency to the brain-damaged Ricky
Rector. 3 5
As President, Clinton is pushing for passage of a crime bill that
would expand the availability of the federal death penalty - de-
spite having an Attorney General who opposes the death penalty.
Clinton's eagerness to gain support for his crime bill from associa-
tions of district attorneys, state attorneys general, and police offi-
cials prompted him to agree, along with Senator Biden, to diminish
128. See The Politics of Death, ECONOMIST, Mar. 24, 1990, at 26.
129. See, e.g., George E. Jordan, Clinton and Crime: Supports Capital Punishment
as a Sign of Toughness, N.Y. NEWSDAY, May 4, 1992, at 3 ("He [Clinton] has said his
support of capital punishment would pre-empt the type of Republican attacks that
weighed down the 1988 campaign of former Massachusetts Gov. Michael Dukakis."
Clinton is fond of saying that Democrats "should no longer feel guilty about protect-
ing the innocent."); id. at 19 ("Supporters and critics cite one of two reasons for Clin-
ton's swing on crime and punishment: political survival in a southern state, where
support for capital punishment is strong, or the political expediency of building a con-
servative record with sights on seeking the presidency.").
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Thomas B. Edsall, III, Democrats Now Willing to Support Death Penalty,
WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 1992, at A14.
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further the availability of habeas corpus relief for people convicted
or sentenced to death.
136
To turn this situation around, it is vital that opponents of the
death penalty and supporters of habeas corpus provide assistance
to those political candidates and public officials who agree with
them on these issues. This support should include (a) advice on
how best to articulate these positions, (b) targeted campaign con-
tributions and (c) public education efforts designed to show the
factual misconceptions underlying much of the public's support for
the death penalty.
Moreover, the organized bar, whatever its members' views may
be about the death penalty, should rise in support of state judges
whose re-election or judicial nominations are opposed because of
their having voted on some occasions to reverse death sentences.
Ultimately, judicial campaigns should be replaced by lifetime merit
appointments if such appointments can be made in the same fash-
ion in which New York's Governor Mario Cuomo has appointed
judges to New York's highest court: in a non-partisan manner
based on merit, without litmus tests or partisan attacks. Unfortu-
nately, the use of litmus tests by recent Presidents in appointing
federal judges and the threatened injection of death penalty poli-
tics into the Senate's judicial confirmation process illustrate poten-
tial dangers in the appointment process. Ultimately, the public
must demand that judges be selected on the basis of merit, not
demagoguery, whether it be by election or by appointment.
It is equally vital that death penalty opponents endeavor to per-
suade political strategists and consultants that opposition to the
death penalty need not be politically fatal, and that changing one's
position to come out in favor of the death penalty can be politically
harmful. Moreover, death penalty opponents and habeas corpus
supporters should allocate their time, money, and endorsements in
a way that will create real political costs for otherwise moderate or
progressive candidates who come out for the death penalty or for
effectively abolishing habeas corpus. This does not necessarily
mean withholding all support from such people. It does mean call-
ing such people to account for your positions and refusing to be as
vigorous in their support.
In short, the best way to fight capital punishment and to restore
habeas corpus in this country is to try to inject some accountability
and responsibility into the process. At this juncture, no one really
136. See supra note 39.
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takes responsibility for the implementation of the death penalty.
Politicians and legislators hide behind their perceptions of political
reality and public opinion, believing that it is politically incorrect to
oppose the death penalty or to support habeas corpus. Judges pur-
port to simply carry out legislation. Governors and pardon boards
say there is no reason to consider clemency because the courts
have provided "super due process", even though the procedural
obstacles the Supreme Court has enacted often lead instead to no
process at all.
Those who understand how the death penalty is really function-
ing in this country must expose these fallacies and provide respon-
sible members of the press with the tools to bring this critical
information to their audiences. If this happens, and if our public
officials are persuaded to act in a more principled manner on this
issue, the death penalty can be abolished in this country, as it has
already been in most of the democratic world. 137
137. The United States and South Africa were the only two large countries in the
western world that continue to implement the death penalty, Amnesty International,
When the State Kills (1989), until South Africa imposed a moratorium on executions
in February 1990. Nelson Mandella has vowed to abolish the death penalty com-
pletely if he is elected president. Reverend Cyril Pillay, in HANDS OFF CAIN 27
(1994).
